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Abstract 
Many business, academic, and scientific groups have recommended that the Congress substantially 
increase R&D spending in the near future. President Bush’s American Competitiveness Initiative calls 
for a doubling of spending over the next decade in selected agencies that deal with the physical 
sciences, including the National Science Foundation. We consider the rationale for government R&D 
spending in the context of globalization and as an investment in human capital and knowledge 
creation with gestation times far longer than Federal funding cycles. To assess the impact of a large 
increase in R&D spending on the science job market, we examine the impact of the 1998- 2003 
doubling of the NIH budget on the bio-medical sciences. We find that the rapid increase in NIH 
spending and ensuing deceleration created substantial adjustment problems in the market for research 
and failed to address long-standing problems with scientific careers that are likely to deter many 
young people from choosing a scientific career. We argue that because research simultaneously 
produces knowledge and add to the human capital of researchers, which has greater value for young 
scientists because of their longer future career life span than to older scientists, there is reason for 
funding agencies to tilt their awards to younger researchers. 
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 In his 2006 State of the Union Address President Bush announced the American 
Competitiveness Initiative – a program that promised to spend substantial federal moneys 
to redress perceived US weaknesses in science and technology.  One of the centrepieces 
of the Initiative was a commitment to double basic R&D spending over the next decade 
at the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy’s Science Core 
programs, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.  Another component 
called for $4.6 billion in R&D tax incentives, intended to induce greater R&D spending 
by private firms. Much of the President’s proposal was based on the National Academy 
of Sciences’ 2006 “Gathering Storm” report, which called for large increases in federally 
funded R&D in physical sciences, among other policies, to keep the US in the forefront 
of science and technology. 
 Congress responded to the Competitiveness Initiative by authorizing increased 
R&D spending, indicating that it desired to increase R&D support. But Congress did not 
appropriate the funds.  Failure to appropriate the money reflected partisan disagreements 
in Washington and the greater importance of other budgetary and political considerations. 
The result was a modest change in federal spending for R&D in the physical sciences and 
stagnant federal support of R&D overall that reduced spending in real terms. Congress 
did, however, extend tax incentives for corporate R&D spending. 
 Between 2000 and 2006 many studies and reports called for improvements in the 
country’s capacity in scientific and technological activity (Freeman, 2006) by increasing 
R&D spending and investing more in science and engineering education.  The call for 
increased resources for science and engineering was based on a widespread belief that 
“solutions to many of the challenges facing society have their roots in our scientific 
understanding, where technology increasingly drives the global economic engine, and 
where many other nations are gaining rapidly in scientific and engineering capabilities” 
(NSF, 2007). Business leaders particularly in high-tech sectors were worried about 
increased foreign competition and the decline of comparative advantage in the R&D 
intensive sectors of the economy.  The science community decried a decreased rate of 
funding basic research proposals, that “may be negatively impacting the academic 
research community, resulting in increased workload and diminished S&E capacity” 
(IPAMM, 2007) The National Institute of Health (NIH) complained that it could not 
support as many high quality research proposals as in the past, and NIH and NSF 
reported that their peer review systems were over-burdened with a growing number of 
research proposals.  The military and defense establishment, whose hires are often limited 
to US citizens, feared that not enough citizens and residents were choosing science and 
engineering careers.1  
 Given that most analysts recognized that the career incentives for entering science 
and engineering were too low to attract more US students, nearly all studies favored 
educational initiatives to improve science in schools as well as spending increases to 
boost demand for scientists and engineers.  The National Academy of Sciences’ Board of 
                                                 
1  An alternative to broad based incentives to increase supply would be for military and defense sectors to 
attract more US citizen scientists and engineers by raising their pay, which would reallocate more citizens 
to those jobs even if the number of US-born scientists did not change.   
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Life Sciences recommended that NIH “take steps to provide PostDocs and early-career 
investigators with more financial support for their own research and establish programs 
for new investigators and staff scientists among other mechanisms”(NAS, 2005). The 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2008) report on alternative models for funding 
the sciences called for funding directed at young investigators and at risky projects that 
could have high payoffs. 
 The widespread support for increasing the US investment in science and 
engineering, particularly in the physical sciences, makes it likely that in the near future 
Congress will substantially boost R&D spending.2 There are precedents for a surge in 
R&D spending to meet perceived national opportunities or needs. In 1998 a bipartisan 
coalition in Congress pressed the Clinton Administration to increase the R&D budget 
substantially, with particular emphasis on the NIH.  The coalition favored a doubling of 
NIH spending over ten years but the Administration chose an even more rapid increase-- 
a doubling in the budget over the next five years. In 2003 the Bush administration 
completed the doubling, but then kept the budget roughly stable in nominal terms. 
Earlier, the Soviet sputnik spurred a huge increase in federal R&D spending between 
1956 and 1962.  There have been smaller bursts of financial support for particular 
programs deemed of special national interest in given time periods such as the War on 
Cancer, Apollo, and the Nano-technology Initiative.   
 How do large concentrated increases in R&D spending affect the market for 
research and the careers of scientists and engineers?  How might the government best 
structure an increase to produce a bigger sustainable research system?  Will increased 
spending improve the job market for young scientists and engineers and attract more 
Americans into the fields as many hope it will do? 
 This paper examines these questions. It reviews some of the evidence on the state 
of science and engineering that motivated the Competitiveness Initiative and the diverse 
reports that called for increased R&D spending. Then it assesses the doubling of the NIH 
budget from 1998 to 2003 and the ensuing deceleration in spending, focusing on the 
adjustment problems that result from rapid acceleration and deceleration of spending. The 
NIH doubling experience provides a warning sign of what might happen in the future to 
the physical sciences if funding increases for NSF and the other agencies that support the 
physical sciences in the same manner as funding increased for NIH.  
Based on this analysis, we consider ways for the federal government to boost 
R&D spending more efficiently in the future. Our main conclusions are: 
 1.  Increased R&D spending will not by itself resolve problems with the American 
scientific research endeavor.  More funds are necessary but not sufficient to improve the 
opportunities for young researchers and to place basic research onto a long-term 
sustainable growth path. 
 2. One-time surges in spending, which produce a deceleration after the surge, 
have sizable adjustment costs.  Instead of making “doubling” spending a goal, policy-
makers would do better to determine a desired ratio of R&D to GDP and to increase 
funding smoothly to attain that goal. Agencies and universities need “bridge funding” or 
                                                 
2 Indicative of the concern and pressure to increase the national investment in science, in the first week of 
May 2008 450 educators, lobbyists, government officials, and business leaders met in Washington to keep 
the issue and Competitiveness Initiative in the forefront of policy-makers. (Mervis, 2008) 
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stabilization policies to buffer research activity from rapid changes in spending.  
 3.The response of researchers to the incentives built into the number and size of 
research grants offer determines the effects of spending initiatives on research activity. 
When a funding agency increases the number and value of research grants, researchers 
submit more proposals, increasing the amount of research, along a supply curve.  When 
an agency reduces the number of awards, in the short run researchers also respond by 
making multiple submissions. This stresses the peer review process and stability of the 
research market. Funding agencies have to balance changes in the number and value of 
grants carefully to reduce the adjustment costs of changes in budgets.  
 4.  Viewing research grants as investments in the human capital of the researcher 
as well as in the production of knowledge, funding agencies should support proposals by 
younger researchers over equivalent proposals of older researchers. The reason is that 
younger researchers, by which we mean those with 20 or so years of likely future 
research careers, are more likely to use their increased human capital in future research 
because they have a longer career ahead of them than older researchers close to 
retirement.  
 
1. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCERN  
The Background 
 The U.S. share of science and engineering activity around the world is declining 
(see Table 1 for an overview). This decline is inevitable as the rest of the world catches 
up to the US in higher education and R&D. In 1970, with just 6% of the world’s 
population the US had 30% of world’s college students and graduated about 40% of 
science and engineering PhDs.  By 2005, as countries around the world invested heavily 
in higher education, the US share of college enrollments had fallen to 13%.  The U.S. 
share of the world’s science and engineering graduates is, moreover, below its share of all 
graduates because science and engineering attract large proportions of students overseas 
than in the US. At the doctorate level, the US share of scientist and engineering degrees 
fell to 20% in 2000 and is expected to reach 15% in 2010. The US contributed about half 
of the world’s R&D spending in the 1970s, but this dropped to about a third by 2003.  
Partly in response to the growth of scientific and engineering talent around the 
world, the multinational firms who undertake most industrial R&D increasingly invest in 
R&D outside the US as well as in the US.  The large number of scientific and engineering 
graduates in China and India combined with the lower wages in those countries make 
them attractive sites for multinational R&D facilities. In 2004 China reported that 
multinationals had established over 750 R&D facilities whereas in 1990, they had none. 
In 1991 the US spent 13 times as much on R&D as China. In 2003 it spent 3.4 only times 
as much (Freeman, 2006).  
About 60% of basic research in the US is conducted in universities, largely funded 
by the federal government.3 The major federal funding agencies for basic research in the 
physical sciences are the NSF, Department of Defence, Department of Energy, and 
                                                 
3 National Science Foundation, National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2006 Data Update. Table 2 shows 
reports that the US spent $63.6 on basic research in 2006 and that $36.9 billion was in colleges and 
universities, of which $24.5 billion was funded by the federal government (66%) 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf07331/pdf/tab2.pdf 
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National Institute of Standards, while the NIH is the main funder of basic research in the 
biological sciences. The NSF supports over 50% of the Federal non-medical fundamental 
research at U.S. colleges and universities.  From 1990 to 2006 the share of R&D funded 
by the federal government fell from 40.5% to 28.4%.  Compared to GDP federal R&D 
fell from 0.112% to 0.073%.4  
  As the US share of scientists and engineers and R&D worldwide has trended 
downward, so too has the US share of scientific publications and citations. Data from the 
Chemical Abstracts Services shows that in 1980 the US had 73% of papers in the field 
whereas in 2003 US researchers had only 40% of the papers (Freeman, 2006). The US 
share of science articles published fell from 39% in 1988 to 29% in 2005 while the US 
share of citations dropped from 36% of articles written in 1992 to 30% of articles written 
in 2002. 
Given the demography of the world, the US cannot maintain the dominance in 
science and technology that it enjoyed in the last half of the Twentieth Century.  It can be 
a leading center of excellence of basic R&D if it invests more in R&D and makes science 
and engineering careers attractive to young Americans and to immigrant scientists and 
engineers.   
 
Why care?  
The calls for increased federal spending on basic science and related policies are 
motivated by economic and national security concerns.  On the economic front, there is 
widespread belief that the US is more likely to maintain production and jobs in high tech 
sectors if the country pioneers scientific advances than if other countries pioneer those 
advances. The growth of high tech employment in Silicon Valley and in University-based 
locations of scientific excellence suggests that innovation, production, and employment 
in high tech occur largely in areas with excellence in science.5  Since leading edge 
industries have the fastest long run productivity growth, pay higher wages to production 
workers,6 and offer spillovers of knowledge to other sectors, there is global competition 
for these industries.  Advocates of increased federal spending for basic R&D also argue 
that the more basic R&D performed in the US, the more likely is it that the country will 
attract industry in research-intensive sectors7.   
Taking the argument a step further, many analysts note that the US’s comparative 
                                                 
4 U.S. R&D increased by 6% in 2006 according to NSF Projections (NSF, 07-317, April 2007 projected; 
1990 from NSF, National Patterns of R&D Resources, 1994, March 1995) 
5 Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) show that there are clusters of biotechnology activity around “star 
researchers” in nearby universities. Similarly, US states with greater supplies of university graduates have 
been in the forefront of the “new economy” (Progressive Policy Institute, 2002). For evidence on the 
impact of the aggregate impact of R&D on productivity see Jones and Williams (2001) and Griliches 
(1998).  
6 Earnings of production and non supervisory workers in the three highly R&D intensive sectors, aerospace, 
chemicals, and computers and electronic products averaged $ 20.00 per hour compared to $ 15.97 per hour 
for production and non supervisory workers in the country as a whole. 
http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit.supp.toc.htm#historical 
7 The idea that other parts of the value chain locate close to R&D is widespread. This may be much less 
true in today’s more globalized world as the value chain can increasingly be disaggregated. For example, in 
pharmaceuticals drug discovery may be done in the US, but clinical trials may be located in Eastern Europe 
and drug manufacturing in India. 
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advantage in global markets lies in high tech, research-intensive industries. Were the US 
to lose comparative advantage in those sectors, it would have to sell goods or services 
with lower technological content on the global market and compete with countries with 
similar technology and low wages. The gains from trade would lessen and wages would 
fall for American workers.   
In terms of national security, proponents of increased US investment in science and 
engineering note that current “technologies for counter-terrorism and homeland security 
are outcomes of earlier US investments in science, technology, and education” (Jackson, 
2003), and argue that science and technology offer the best defense against terrorist 
threats. The National Security Agency and various Defense Department laboratories and 
contractors hire only US citizens for critical research tasks, which make them particularly 
sensitive to the supply of citizens in the relevant fields.  The scientist and engineering 
work force in security areas has become top heavy with older workers, which will create 
large replacement demands for citizen researchers. 
 
A more critical assessment  
Economic analysis provides some support for these arguments but also offers 
some caution about how much weight to place on them.  For reasons of knowledge 
spillovers and economic competitiveness, investments in basic research can pay off in 
ways that justify major public investments8.  But to determine whether the US is 
currently at, below, or above, the socially optimal level of public spending on basic 
research is not an easy task.  In a global economy, where other countries are also 
investing in basic and applied research, and where major US-owned firms have become 
“global firms”, it has become more difficult to assess the optimal level of public support 
for basic research than it was in the past. 
 
Knowledge spillovers 
 Economists focus on knowledge externalities as the main reason for public 
spending on research. Because of the public good nature of knowledge, the benefits of 
research “spillover” to other agents and is only partially captured by the person or firm 
who originally invested in it. The result is that the private market will invest less in R&D 
than is socially optimal, giving a strong rationale for government spending on R&D in 
various ways. A large body of evidence shows that knowledge spillovers are statistically 
and economically significant9. Such spillovers are the foundation of modern growth 
theory (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1990; Romer, 1989). 
While knowledge has always moved across international boundaries10, the spread 
of higher education and transfer of technology by multinational firms from advanced 
countries has made R&D more international than ever before (Freeman, 2006).  If 
knowledge spread instantly across boundaries, the rationale for government subsidies to 
research would decrease in favor of global subsidies11. In reality there is some 
                                                 
8 There may be other market failure justifications, such as imperfections in financial markets. 
9 For a classic survey see Griliches (1992) and for more recent evidence see Bloom, Schankerman and Van 
Reenen (2006). 
10 See Keller (2004) for a survey and Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen (2006) for recent evidence. 
11 More generally, the rationale for country support depends on the relative rate of diffusion of knowledge 
 7
localization or “stickiness” to research so that the country or region within a country that 
does the research disproportionately benefits from the spillover. But modern 
communications such as the Internet and falling transport costs appears to have reduced 
this advantage (Griffith, Lee and Van Reenen, 2007), weakening the spillover 
justification for R&D subsidies.  By a similar logic, the growth of an international labor 
market for scientists has meant that many US universities attract PostDocs and faculty 
from the international market, reducing the necessity of using US taxpayers’ money to 
train the next generation of scientists and engineers.  
 
Economic “Competitiveness” 
Firms compete in the marketplace: when one firm does better it is often at the 
expense of other firms.  Countries do not “compete” in the same sense.  While there are 
situations in which one country’s gain is another country’s loss (e.g. Baumol and 
Gomory, 2004) the benefits of R&D-induced or other innovations that improve 
productivity in once country are likely to flow to persons in other countries as well.  
Given the public goods nature of R&D and trade in goods and services, the expansion of 
modern scientific and technological activity in the world should improve the lives of 
people worldwide regardless of the location of the innovative activity. If a medical 
scientist in China, India, the UK, or anywhere else finds a cure for cancer, we will all 
benefit.  If a German innovation lowers the price of household goods and services, we 
will all benefit. If scientific advances and innovations overseas lead foreign firms to set 
up production facilities in the US or if US firms exploit overseas innovations to produce 
in the US this will create jobs as well as better products.  
 At the same time, countries can use publicly funded R&D to boost their country’s 
strategic position in some sectors, potentially creating comparative advantage that would 
not exist absent the public support (e.g. in the commercial airline market). Strategic trade 
theory has models in which R&D subsidies can help countries attract and retain rent-
generating R&D intensive sectors (e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1985)12. At the same time, 
the fall of transportation costs and entry barriers makes multinational R&D more 
internationally mobile. For example, “footloose” R&D may be able to move more 
quickly to jurisdictions offering a more favorable tax regime for R&D (see Wilson, 2008, 
for evidence of this in the US context). By making it easier to attract R&D, this sharpens 
the case for subsidizing science on economic competitiveness grounds.  
 These arguments are summarized in Table 2. In our view, knowledge spillovers 
are the strongest argument for R&D subsidies, especially for basic research compared to 
applied research. Nonetheless, globalization has probably weakened the case for such 
subsidies whereas it has strengthened the case for subsidies to applied research.  There 
are two caveats to this assessment. First, if basic research is complementary to applied 
research, then subsidies to basic research could “crowd in” more applied research. There 
is evidence on this from the positive local effects of university research (e.g. Jaffe, 1989). 
                                                                                                                                                 
within a country and across countries.  If diffusion rates increase proportionately the social vs. private 
margin for national investments would be stable. 
12 Convincing empirical evidence of the quantitative importance of these strategic R&D competitions is 
rare. Those that have studied it generally find that the strategic R&D competition effect is dwarfed by the 
knowledge spillovers effect (e.g. Bloom, Schankerman, Van Reenen, 2006). 
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But at some point basic and applied research are substitutes – in terms of Federal 
subsidies for example, spending more on one means cutting back funding on the other. 
Second, the normative argument for strategic R&D subsidies is weakened by the fact that 
other countries may respond to US subsidies with their own subsidies.  When countries 
compete in subsidizing R&D to attract high tech firms, it is like an auction for 
multinational R&D. The main winners of this auction are likely to be multinational 
companies and their shareholders rather than taxpayers. 
 
The US position in innovation 
While the US share of world R&D and the scientific and engineering work force has 
fallen as other countries have invested higher education and research, the US remains the 
world leader in scientific and technological competence.  The US spends more on R&D 
in total dollars and has more scientists and engineers doing research, basic and applied, 
than any other country.  The ratio of R&D to GDP in the US is higher than in other major 
advanced countries, save for Japan (NSF, 2008, Appendix table 4-35).  Despite the EU’s 
“Lisbon Agenda” push to raise the R&D/GDP ratio to 3%, the large countries in the 
European Union continue to fall far short of the US’s level of 2.6% in 2005.   
European countries have increased government investment in R&D relative to GDP 
but European firms invest a much smaller share of revenues on R&D than do US firms, 
who have raised their R&D budgets even as the federal government has invested less.  
Figure 1 shows the position of R&D performed by business as a proportion of GDP in 
several major countries since 1981. The US business R&D to GDP ratio has remained 
broadly stable, rising modestly from 1991 (1.5%) to 2006 (1.7%). It exceeds all the other 
major nations bar Japan. Chinese business R&D has come, by contrast, from nowhere in 
the 1980s to over 1% of GDP today. This illustrates both the remarkable catch-up by 
China and the fact that China remains less R&D intensive than the US.  
How has the US done in the R&D intensive high tech industries? Table 3 shows 
that from 1980 through 2003 the US did well by several measures of innovativeness and 
production in high tech. The share of USPTO patent applications going to first-named US 
persons remained roughly constant from 1985 to 2005 while the share of European Patent 
Office applications going to first-named US persons fell only slightly. In high-tech 
manufacturing13 the US share of world gross revenue and of value added rose during the 
1990s boom and remained high through the early 2000s.  In the global economy where 
firms outsource parts of activities to different places in the world, the most meaningful 
measure of US economic activity relative to other countries is value added.  The US share 
of world value added in high tech rose from 25% in 1990 to 42% in 2003.   
Where US performance has been less impressive is in the balance of trade. In 
1980 and 1990 the US ran a large balance of trade surplus in high tech, which partially 
counterbalanced the country’s trade deficit in other goods.  The trade balance in high tech 
turned negative in 2000 and has gone more negative since, along with the rest of the 
country’s balance of trade (Weller and Wheeler, 2008) . 
Since patents and production depend on past scientific advances, it is possible that 
the positive picture of US performance in high tech scientific-intensive sectors shown in 
                                                 
13 This is defined by the OECD to include aerospace, communications equipment, office machinery and 
computers, pharmaceuticals, and scientific instruments 
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table 3 reflects the advantages of US investments in R&D in past years.  From this 
perspective, the call for increased federal R&D spending and the investment in science 
and engineering worker is more of a pre-emptive warning than a response to any 
economic disaster.  Given that research is exploration of the unknown with payoffs in the 
future, this is arguably the appropriate way to interpret the competitiveness initiative and 
plethora of calls for additional R&D spending. 
 
 
2. THE NIH DOUBLING 
Background 
 To see how a potential future rapid increase in R&D spending on the physical 
sciences might affect researchers, we examine the 1998-2003 doubling of the NIH 
research budget and the subsequent deceleration of NIH funds.14 Figure 2 displays the 
level and percentage change in NIH funds from 1995 through 2007.  From 1998 to 2003 
the NIH budget grew by double-digit amounts in nominal terms, which raised annual 
NIH spending from about $14 billion to $27 billion.  In constant CPI dollars real research 
funding increased by 76%.  In the decade prior to the doubling (1987 to 1997), real NIH 
funding deflated by the CPI increased by only 40% (NSF, 2004, Table 1H).  Thus the 
doubling raised NIH spending by twice as much in five years as it had done in the 
previous decade.  Using the Biomedical R&D Price Index (BRDPI), which rose more 
rapidly than the CPI, the doubling increased spending by 66%.    
 When the doubling ended, the Bush Administration recommended a rapid 
deceleration in NIH funding, which Congress largely followed. The rate of increase in 
spending dropped in nominal terms to 3% in 2004, then to 2.2% in 2005, to  -0.1% in 
2006 and to 0% in 2007.  Using the CPI deflator, real NIH spending was 6.6% lower in 
2007 than in 2004; it is expected to fall 13.4% below the 2004 peak by 2009 (Garrison 
and McGuire, 2008). Using the BRDPI deflator, real spending was down 10.9% through 
2007. The drop in the real NIH budget shocked the agency and the bioscience community 
as it undid much of the extraordinary increase in funding from the doubling.  NIH 
director Elias Zerhouni said that even in “the worse scenario, people really didn’t think 
that the NIH budget would go below inflation” (Couzin and Miller, 2007). NIH 
responded first by reducing the number of grants awarded, and then by reducing the 
amounts of grants. For the post doctorate researchers trained during the doubling period 
and for the young researchers who obtained their first independent research grants during 
the doubling, the deceleration created a career crisis.  For principal investigators (PI’s) 
with NIH support, it also posed major problems, as the probability of continuing a grant 
and making a successful new application fell and as the size of grants shrunk.  Research 
labs were pressured to cut staff.  At NIH, which is the single largest employer of bio-
                                                 
14 The experience of the NIH doubling is more relevant to a future increase in R&D than the doubling of 
federal R&D spending following the Sputnik.  In that period the supply of S&E workers was primarily 
domestic, so that the increase raised salaries greatly, inducing more native students to enter the field and 
increase supply in the future (Freeman, 1975).  Today, with the international market in science and 
engineering workers, supply is more elastic so that increased spending will likely have a greater impact on 
quantities than wages. 
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medical researchers in the country, with over 1,000 principal investigators and 6,000-
7,000 mostly PhD researchers the reduced funding led to a contraction in the number 
principal investigators by 9%.  “A completely new category of nightmare” was the 
description given by a researcher in the National Institute of Child Health and 
Development, which was especially hard hit (Science, March 7, 2008, p 1324).  Others in 
the scientific and university community also reacted with dismay or horror. Typical 
examples are: 
  “The marvellous engine of American biomedical research that was constructed 
during the last half of the 20th century is being taken apart, piece by piece.” -- Robert 
Weinberg (founder of Whitehead Institute) Cell, July, 2006. 
  “Without effective national policies to recruit young scientists to the field, and 
support their research over the long term, in 10 to 15 years, we’ll have more scientists 
older than 65 than those younger than 35.  This is not a sustainable trend in biomedical 
research and must be addressed aggressively.”-- NIH Director Zerhouni. 
 Most of the scientific community views the doubling as having significantly 
increased the rate of bio-medical knowledge creation above what it otherwise would have 
been. But the effects of the doubling may have been muted due to the adjustment costs 
associated with such a rapid increase (see below). If, moreover, labor supply is inelastic, 
the increase in funding will show up in the short ruin in higher wages for scientists’ rather 
than an increase in research (Goolsbee 1998), though in long run the higher wages will 
presumably attract more talent into science. Given the international mobility of scientists, 
moreover, increased spending is more likely to prompt migration into the US of overseas 
scientists and post docs than in the past. 
Still, it is hard to find clear evidence that the doubling raised scientific output. 
Sachs (2007) noted that the number of bio-medical publications from US labs grew at a 
steady rate after 1999.  The share of US S&E articles in the biological and medical 
sciences from 1995 to 2005 (NSF, 2007, Appendix table 5-36) did not tilt toward these 
areas despite their increased share of the nation’s basic research budget.  Using a 
regression discontinuity design that compared the publications of scientists who just 
succeeded in obtaining an NIH grant with those who just failed to obtain a grant in the 
period 1980 to 2000, Jacob and Lefgren (2007) found only a small impact of receiving an 
NIH grant on research output, though one that is larger for younger than for older 
scientists. To be sure, without a well-specified counterfactual of what would have 
happened absent the doubling or with some adjustment in the numbers of articles for their 
quality, we cannot rule out the possibility that the funding in fact spurred more and better 
science.  Still, the data are consistent with the notion that by increasing spending quickly 
in a short period, NIH did less to increase scientific production than it might have done if 
it had increased spending more evenly over time.  
 Our analysis highlights two problems with the NIH pattern of increasing R&D 
spending: the frontloading of the increase in a short period of time; and the allocation of 
the increase between the size and number of grants and between younger and older 
researchers. We consider the economics of each problem in turn. 
 
Big Push vs. Gradual Change 
 In general, a rapid acceleration in spending followed by a rapid deceleration is an 
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inefficient way to get to a permanently higher level of research activity and stock of 
research scientists.  To see why this is so we apply the classic accelerator model of 
investment in physical capital to increasing R&D.  We treat the stock of research by the 
“perpetual inventory formula” 1)1( −−+= ttt KIK δ , where K is the number of scientists 
engaged in research; I is the number of newly trained scientists (Post Docs) who enter 
into research and δ  is the proportion of scientists who leave research each year for 
retirement or other reasons. In this model tK  is the stock of activity in year t, tI  is the 
flow of new activity and δ  is the depreciation rate.   K and I are related to the number of 
trained scientists or new scientists by a fraction θ, which measures the proportion that 
work in academia doing basic research. The rest are engaged in other activities – working 
in industry, government – or teaching, doing administration, and so on. 
 In the accelerator model of investment, an increase in the demand for output 
induces firms to seek a higher capital stock to meet the new demand. This increases 
investment spending quickly.  When firms reach the desired capital stock, they reduce the 
rate of investment sharply.  Analysts of business cycles have long used this model to 
explain the greater volatility of investment than of consumption spending that contributes 
to cyclical fluctuations in the economy.  In the case of basic R&D, assume that society 
wants to increase the stock of research activity from KOLD to a new desired level of KNEW.   
The goal is to increase the stock of research activity, not to “double” or otherwise 
increase the flow of spending.  While it may attract public or political support by making 
the increase in spending the goal, it is the sustainable stock of research activity that 
presumably contributes to national output. 
The optimal path to attaining a higher stock depends on the costs of adjustment, 
which will include such things as disruptions to labs, hiring new staff, buying new 
equipment, and so on. Most empirical studies find evidence that adjustment costs for 
R&D are substantial compared to other forms of investment15.  We assume that the costs 
rise more than proportionately with the size of the change in any period. Building one 
new R&D lab involves disruption; building five new labs at the same time is likely to be 
more than five times as disruptive16. Many models of adjustment use a quadratic cost 
curve to measure this more than proportionate rise in cost. If adjustment costs take any 
convex form of this type the ideal adjustment path is a slow incremental movement to the 
new desired level.  This would mean increasing R&D incrementally to reach KNEW rather 
than increasing it in a sudden burst.  
 Figure 3 shows the difference between the optimal relatively smooth adjustment 
to the new level of K and adjustment that more closely mirrors the NIH doubling. At the 
start of the period investment is just equal to the depreciated old capital (e.g. new Post 
Doc flow exactly balances the retiring older scientists so 1−= tt KI δ ). The dotted line of 
circles shows the ideal increase to the new level KNEW.  The line of triangles is closer to 
what actually happened. The area in between determines the inefficiency of the system.  
The inefficiency means that society could have greater total R&D activity in the long run 
if it increased spending more gradually.  With quadratic adjustment costs, the inefficiency 
                                                 
15 Hall (1992), Himmelberg and Peterson (1994) or Bond and Van Reenen (2008). 
16 Adjustment costs come in many forms. They include building new R&D labs, recruiting and training 
new staff and system wide adjustment costs that we discuss shortly. 
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can be substantial17.   
 The way bio-medical research works, with senior scientists running labs in which 
Post Doctorates and graduate students perform most of the hands-on work, much of the 
adjustment costs fall onto young researchers.  An increase in R&D increases the number 
of Post Docs hired and the number of graduate students that principal investigators seek 
to attract to their labs.  Paralleling the rapid rise of investment when demand for output 
rises in the accelerator model of physical capital, the number of Post Docs/graduate 
student researchers grows sharply with increased R&D. The benefits or costs of the 
adjustment fall disproportionately on the new entrants into the market.  On the benefit 
side, increases in demand should raise the pay and job opportunities more for new 
graduates than for older scientists.  On the cost side, young persons trained during an 
upsurge in spending will compete with a larger supply of young biomedical researchers 
after the upsurge, when there are likely to be no greater or even fewer independent 
research opportunities than when they were attracted to the field.   
Part A of Figure 4 shows that during the doubling period the number of Post Docs 
increased rapidly while the number of principal investigators barely changed.   Part B of 
the figure shows that much of the increase in Post Docs during the doubling period came 
from foreign-born PhDs, of whom about half were trained outside the US.  
 Even before the doubling there was a sizable increase in the number of post-docs 
in the US.  The number of postdocs began increasing rapidly in the early 1980s (Garrison 
and McGuire, 2007,slide 28), producing a major imbalance between the number working 
in academic labs and the number of tenure-track academic jobs to which they could 
aspire. In 1987 the ratio of Post Docs to tenured faculty in the life sciences was 0.54 – or 
approximately one Post Doc for every two faculty.  By 1999, the ratio of Post Docs to 
tenured faculty had risen to 0.77.  The situation did not change much in the doubling 
period.  The number of full-time senior faculty in the life sciences grew by 13% (NSF, 
2008, appendix table 5-19) while the number of Post Docs in biological sciences grew by 
18% (NSF, 2006, table 49). In the 1970s about three quarters of Post Docs obtained 
academic jobs, but no more than 20% to 30% of the increased number in the 2000s can 
expect positions in academic research.  The vast bulk of Post Docs will end up in non-
academic research jobs.  The slowdown of NIH spending after the doubling led to 
effectively no growth for either senior faculty or Post Docs. 
 In sum, the rapid acceleration and deceleration of NIH spending created problems 
for researchers and potential researchers.  In considering any future increases in federal 
support for basic research, policy-makers should focus on attaining a socially desirable  
sustainable rate of scientific activity relative to GDP rather than on increasing the rate of 
spending over a short period. The optimal policy is to move slowly to the desired level of 
R&D, minimizing as far as possible adjustment costs, rather than following a “feast then 
                                                 
17 If R&D spending were mainly an irreversible fixed cost then the optimal adjustment path in Figure 3 
would not be smooth adjustment, but rather a sudden shift closer to the actual change. This is unlikely to be 
a good description of adjustment costs however, especially at the aggregate level. Also note that our 
analysis assumes ignores any possible advantage to producing new research earlier than later beyond the 
standard discounting of future benefits -- for instance through spillovers over time that improve the 
productivity of future research.  If there are such gains, they must eventually suffer from diminishing 
returns so that rising adjustment costs dominate the calculation on the margin where the decision about 
funding is made.   
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famine” spending policy.  We offer some suggestions as to how to do this in a world 
where Congress sets budgets annually in our conclusion. 
 
Internal organization of bio-medical research  
 At the heart of the American bio-medical science enterprise are the R01 grants 
that NIH gives to fund individual scientists and their teams of Post Doctorate employees 
and graduate students.  The system of funding individual researchers on the basis of 
unsolicited applications for research support comes close enough to economist’s views of 
how a decentralized market mechanism operates to suggest this ought to be an efficient 
way to conduct research compared, say, to some central planner mandating research 
topics.  The individual researchers choose the most promising line of research based on 
“local knowledge” of their special field.  They submit proposals to funding agencies, 
where panels of experts – “study sections” in the NIH world – give independent peer 
review, ranking proposals in accordance with criteria set out by funding agencies and 
their perceived quality. Finally, the agency funds as many proposals with high rankings 
that it can within its budget constraint.   
On the funding side, there is also competition.  There are non-government funders 
such as the Howard Hughes Foundation, a major supporter of independent researchers, 
and many medical foundations focused on particular diseases or issues, as well as NSF 
and other government agencies. NIH itself, moreover, is a diverse institution with a 
variety of programs, institutes, and centers that make their own research support 
decisions. With many groups seeking to support research and many scientists seeking 
support for their research, the level of competition would seem to be sufficiently broad 
and wide to yield good economic outcomes.    
Still, in the market for bio-medical research, NIH is the 800-pound gorilla.   For 
most academic bio-scientists winning an NIH R01 grant is critical to their research 
careers.  It gives young scientists the opportunity to run their own lab rather than to work 
in the lab of a senior researcher or to have to abandon research entirely.  For scientists 
who have an NIH grant, winning a continuation grant is often an implicit criterion for 
obtaining tenure at a research university.   
 Table 4 provides a statistical overview of the RO1 granting process from 1980, 
when it was relatively easy for bio-medical scientists to obtain grant support, through the 
1998-2003 doubling period and through 2007. It presents data for two groups of 
applicants for research awards. The first group consists of “potential new awardees” -- 
researchers who had not previously applied for an NIH grant.18 Because Post Docs rarely 
apply for the RO1s, potential first time awardees are primarily newly hired assistant 
professors in research universities.19 The second group consists of experienced 
                                                 
18 Applicants are considered new investigators if they have not previously served as the principal 
investigators (PI) on any Public Health Service-supported research project other than a small grant (R03), 
an Academic Research Enhancement Award (R15), an exploratory/developmental grant (R21), or certain 
research career awards directed principally to physicians, dentists, or veterinarians at the beginning of their 
research career (K01, K08, and K12). Current or past recipients of Independent Scientist and other non 
mentored career awards (K02, K04) are not considered new investigators 
19 While NIIH has no restriction against post-docs applying for research grants, its website states that: 
“before you seek an independent research grant, you should hold a Ph.D. or M.D; Have a faculty-level 
position, usually assistant professor or higher; Have a publication record in the field in which you are 
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researchers, those who had previously been funded by NIH.  They may be applying for a 
continuation grant or possibly a new grant to undertake a project that differs from what 
they had been working on.  
 In 1980 the agency received more applications from potential new awardees than 
from experienced researchers but gave more awards to previous awardees than to new 
investigators. It funded 44% of experienced applications vs. 22% of applications from 
new investigators. As the stock of researchers increased in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
number of submissions from previous awardees increased. By 1998 the agency had fewer 
submissions and gave fewer awards to new researchers than in 1980, while it had more 
submissions and gave more grants to experienced researchers.   
During the doubling period, the number of applications from both potential new 
awardees and experienced researchers increased significantly and NIH gave more grants 
to both.  The deceleration in the funding of NIH produced a sizable drop in number of 
grants awarded from 2003 to 2006 even as the number of submissions increased, with 
again the percentage changes being larger for the potential awardees.  In 2006 NIH 
trimmed the amounts it gave for continuing grants by 2.35% despite inflation, and used 
the funds saved to increase the number of grants to new researchers, though the number 
of awards still remained below the number in 2003.   It did this in an effort to keep new 
researchers with high quality proposals in research activity.   
The lines in Table 4 referring to success rates of potential first time awardees with 
their original proposal or with a first amendment shows another change in the research 
process: a marked drop in the percentage of applicants who gain a grant with their 
original submission20.  In 1980 55% of awardees obtained support on the first submission 
compared to 28% of awardees in 2007. Increasingly, researchers gain awards after 
amending the submission to meet with objections or suggestions of the panel that 
reviewed their proposal. The sum of the percentages for success with the original 
proposal and the first amendment also drop over time, implying that NIH asked for 
second or third submissions before giving a grant.  This means that projects were delayed 
for perhaps a year. 
  While it is common to refer to new RO1 awardees as “young researchers” the 
term is a misnomer.  Because R01s generally go to scientists who are assistant professors 
or higher in their rank, and the length of post doctorate jobs has grown over time, the 
average age of a new recipient was 42.9 in 2005 up from 35.2 in 1970 and 37.3 in the mid 
1980s.  Figure 5 shows that in 1980 22% of grants went to scientists 35 and younger, but 
the proportion trended downward so that in 2005, just 3% of grants went to scientists 35 
and younger. By contrast, the proportion of grants going to scientists 45 and older 
increased from 22% to 77% of R01s.  Within the 45 and older group, the largest gainers 
were scientists aged 55 and older.  
Part of this change is associated with an aging of the science work force, but most 
                                                                                                                                                 
applying; Work in a research institution that will provide the resources, e.g., equipment and lab space, you 
will need to complete the project.” http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/grants/new/new06.htm  “ In addition, You 
will also need preliminary data for an R01.”  Universities have general rules guiding the level of 
investigator that may apply for independent funding and about the resources they will provide to help in the 
grant process.   
20 Much like journals, study groups can choose to accept or reject new submissions outright or ask for a 
revision of the original submission. 
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of it is due to the changing organization of research, which gives older investigators 
substantive advantages in obtaining funding and places younger researchers as Post Docs 
in their labs.  Taking account of the distribution of PhD bio-scientists by age, the relative 
odds of a younger scientist gaining an NIH grant compared to someone 45 and older 
dropped over tenfold. We do not attribute this pattern to the doubling of research moneys, 
as it reflects a longer run trend.  But we note that NIH did not use the extra moneys to 
improve career prospects for graduate students or Post Docs.  The result is considerable 
malaise among graduate students and Post Docs in the life sciences as well as among 
senior scientists concerned with the health of their field. (NRC, 1998; NAS, 2005; 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008).   
 
Research grants for younger scientists? 
Should the country be concerned about the small declining share of grant moneys 
that goes to younger scientists and to the increased number of years that it takes them to 
obtain independent research support? In terms of economic analysis, there are three 
reasons for believing that the concentration of research support on older scientists has 
deleterious effects on research productivity.  
The first is the possibility that scientists are more creative and productive at 
younger ages.  To the extent that younger scientists are more likely to undertake 
breakthrough research when they have their own grant support rather than when they 
work as Post Docs in the labs of senior investigators and are more likely to undertake 
such work than older scientists, concentrating research support on the older group 
reduces the productivity of research and the payoff from government funding.21 
  The second reason is that supporting scientists earlier in their careers will 
increase the pecuniary attractiveness of science and engineering to young persons 
choosing their life’s work. It will do this because the normal discounting of future returns 
makes money and opportunities received earlier more valuable than money and 
opportunities received later. If students who consider science careers had a better chance 
to become independent investigators in their thirties rather than in their forties or fifties, 
we would expect the number who chose science to be higher than it is today.22   
The third reason relates to the likely use of new knowledge uncovered by 
researchers.  A research project creates two outputs.  It produces research findings that 
are public information.  But it also increases the human capital of the researcher, who 
knows better than anyone else the new outcomes and who probably has better ideas of 
how to apply them to future research or other activities than other persons. Assume that 
an older researcher and a younger researcher are equally productive and accrue the same 
additional knowledge and skills from a research project.  Then because the younger 
person will have more years to use the new knowledge, the social payoff from funding 
the younger person will be higher than from funding the older person.  Just as human 
                                                 
21  There have been some analyses of the relation between age and scientific productivity.  See Jones (2005) 
and the literature cited therein.  But there is no analysis of whether working in someone else’s lab affects 
productivity. 
22  Freeman (2005) and Freeman, Chang and Chiang (2005) show substantial responsiveness of young 
persons to NSF Graduate Research Fellowships.  It is hard to imagine if they offered $30,000 awards 20 
years into the future, they would apply to the Fellowships as much as they have.  
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capital theory says that people should invest in education when they are younger, because 
they have more years to reap the returns than if they invested when they are older, this 
line of thinking implies that it would be better to award research grants to younger 
scientists than to otherwise comparable older scientists.  
In sum, economic analysis lends some support to the views of the scientific 
community that society would likely get more “bang for its research buck” if the internal 
structure of research funding was more favorable to younger researchers than it is. 
 
3. FUNDING AGENCY AND RESEARCHER BEHAVIOR 
Funding agencies and researchers interact in the market for research grants. An 
agency with a given budget must decide how to allocate the budget between the number 
of grants and the sizes of grants, presumably with the goal of maximizing research 
output. Should it give fewer large grants or more small grants?  Should it favor new 
research submissions, whether from younger or experienced researchers, or continuance 
of existing grants from experienced researchers?  The effect of these decisions on 
research output depends in turn on how do researchers respond to changes in the dollar 
value and number of potential research awards. 
Table 5 shows that during the doubling, NIH increased the average value and 
number of awards, particularly for new submissions (which includes new projects 
proposed by experienced researchers as well as projects by new investigators). With the 
success rate of awards stable at roughly 25% -- a proportion that the agency views as 
desirable to support on the basis of the quality of proposals, -- the number of awards 
increased proportionate to the number of submissions. 
From 2003 to 2006 when the budget contracted in real terms, NIH maintained the 
value of awards in real terms, and reduced the number of new awards by 20%.  With the 
number of new submissions growing, the result was a large drop in the success rate. In 
2007, NIH squeezed the budgets of existing projects and raised the number of new 
awards.  The data on continuation grants for existing projects shows a similar pattern – 
increases in the number and amount awarded during the period of doubling and 
reductions in numbers awarded relative to submissions afterwards.   
      Although its budget increased more modestly in the early and mid 2000s, NSF 
faced similar decisions regarding the allocation of budgets between the number and 
average size of awards (amount per year and duration) and between new and previously 
funded investigators. Responding to a 2001 Office of Management and Budget concern 
that NSF researchers spent too much time writing grant proposals instead of doing 
research, NSF decided to increase the amount of research awards while holding fixed or 
reducing the number of awards. Giving larger grants to a smaller proportion of 
researchers would, in NSF’s eyes “minimize the time PIs would spend writing multiple 
proposals and managing administrative tasks, providing increased stability for supporting 
graduate students” (IPAMM, 2007, p5).   Table 6 shows that, consistent with this, NSF 
increased the mean dollar value of awards from 1997 to 2006 by 72% (from $78,223 to 
$134,595) compared to a 13% increase in the number of awards. The number of research 
proposals grew rapidly over the period, presumably in part due to the increased dollar 
value of awards, but also possibly because of the greater ease of submitting proposals 
through the NSF’s fast track system.  In any case, the success rate for funding dropped 
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from 30% to 21%, which our analysis suggests would spur additional applications.  In 
2006, NSF funded 62% of highly rated proposals whereas in 1997 it had funded 76% of 
such proposals.  Proposals that were highly rated but ultimately declined represented $2 
billion in requested research support in 2006 (IPAMM, 2007). 
How did researchers respond to these changes in the allocation of funds between 
amounts and numbers?  What can we learn from those responses to guide agency 
decisions about the division of any future large increase in R&D spending and the 
inevitable ensuing deceleration in the rate of spending? 
Researchers responded to the NIH doubling by submitting more proposals to the 
agency.  While NSF spending increased more modestly in the late 1990s early 2000s, 
NSF saw an increase in proposals as well.  Given higher grant awards and increased 
numbers of awards (with roughly constant funding rates), the growth of submissions 
reflects standard economic supply behavior: positive responses to the incentive of more 
and higher valued research awards. What about responses to declines in research support? 
If researchers submitted a single proposal to agencies, we would expect reduced numbers 
or sizes of awards that lower the expected value of a submission to lead them to make 
fewer submissions. But the fact that researchers can submit more than one proposal to 
funding agencies alters their potential supply behavior, at least in the short run.  Some 
researchers could submit more proposals in periods of low numbers of awards in the hope 
of improving the chance they will gain at least one award and thus be able to continue 
their research work. 
Table 5 shows that this is what happened in NIH after the doubling period.  The 
average number of submissions per new award granted and per continuation awards 
granted rose sharply from 2003 to 2007 after changing only modestly during the doubling 
period.  By 2007 NIH awardees were putting in roughly two proposals to get an award.  
Data on the proportion winning awards on an original proposal in the table tells a similar 
story: fewer investigators gaining awards on original proposals, inducing them to amend 
proposals in response to peer review reports to increase their chances of gaining a 
research grant.   
The data for NSF in table 6 tells a similar story.  The number of research 
proposals submitted per PI before receiving one award increased by 1.7 in 1998-2000 to 
2.2 in 2004-2006.  The statistics underlying the averages in the table show that the 
proportion of PI awardees making a single submission dropped from 59% to 51% while 
the proportion of PI’s making three or more submissions increased from 18% to 26%.  
The notion that by giving fewer large grants NSF would reduce the time spent writing 
multiple rewards turned out to be largely wrong.  Faced with the risk of losing support 
and closing or contracting their labs, PIs made multiple submissions. 
In Appendix B we present a simple model of researcher behavior consistent with 
this form of behavior.  The model gives researchers the option of submitting 0, 1 or 2 
proposals to a funding agency.  We assume that each researcher wants only a single grant 
to conduct their work.  In this situation, the very best researchers submit one application 
(since they are virtually assured of getting support), but some researchers choose to 
submit 2 proposals because they judge their chances of winning as lower but still above 
the costs of developing a proposal.  A third group decides against making a proposal.  
When the value of awards increases, a larger proportion of scientists make bids and a 
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larger number make two bids, and conversely when the value of awards decreases.  The 
interesting behavior occurs when the number of awards granted changes. An increase in 
the number of awards increases the number of researchers who apply as the chances of 
winning increases. But when the number of awards decreases, the model says that it is 
likely that a larger proportion of applicants will put in two bids.  Some highly able 
scientists make additional proposals because they are uncertain that they will gain an 
award and maintain their lab.  The result is an increase in the average number of 
proposals from researchers who ultimately gain an award, and a research grant process 
that consumes a larger fraction of researchers’ time.  In addition, the increased proportion 
of potential grantees writing multiple grants means that they have less time to peer-
review the proposals of their colleagues. This puts a strain on the whole system. 
It is possible that this process by itself discourages some young persons from going 
on in science.  Who wants to spend time writing proposal after proposal with modest 
probabilities of success?  It may also lead to more conservative science, as researchers 
shy away from the big research questions in favor manageable topics that fit with 
prevailing fashion and gain support from study groups. 
While our analysis deals with only some of the decisions facing research granting  
agencies and researchers, it highlights makes a key point about the research process: that 
funding agencies need good knowledge of the likely behavior of researchers to 
allocations of funds in order to get the most research from their budgets. Conceptually, 
there is an optimal division of budgets between numbers and values of awards and 
between new and continuing grantees that depends on the response of researchers. From 
NIH experience with the doubling and ensuing cutback in funds and NSF experience with 
increasing the size of awards while barely changing the numbers, the agencies have 
presumably learned enough about researcher behavior that they would respond differently 
to future increases in R&D budgets than they have in the past. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 This study directs attention at how policy-makers might best undertake any future 
sizable increase in R&D spending, of the type envisaged for the physical sciences by the 
American Competitiveness Initiative.  
 We have noted that globalization affects traditional justifications for government 
funding of R&D as a public good. Increasing spillovers of knowledge across national 
borders reduces the ability of any country to recoup the benefits of basic R&D, and thus 
weakens the public goods argument for greater US spending.  But at the same time, the 
greater international mobility of high tech research-intensive industries that are drawn by 
strong basic research in an area argues for larger support of basic R&D than in the past.  
We have made no effort to quantify these two effects. 
 Our analysis stresses that future increases in research spending should be seen in 
terms of increasing the stock of sustainable activity rather than in attaining some arbitrary 
target (ie doubling) in a short period.  There are virtues to a smooth approach to higher 
(or lower) levels of spending, which are particularly important for R&D, as distinct from 
most other forms of investment, because it takes considerable time to build up human 
capital, which then has a potentially long period of return.  Since Congress determines 
budgets annually, the question becomes how either the Congress can commit to a more 
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stable spending goal or how agencies and universities can offset large changes in funding 
from budget to budget.  
 We have two suggestions here.  The first would be for research grants to contain 
an extra “stabilization” overhead with the stipulation that universities or other research 
institutions place those payments into a stabilization fund to provide bridge support for 
researchers when R&D spending levels off. The second is to assign some of the R&D tax 
credits that boost applied research to a basic research fund that would provide smooth 
funding for basic research. There is considerable evidence that fiscal incentives for R&D 
impact on firm’s R&D behavior23. Whether it is better to support applied research 
through tax breaks or basic research through grants will depend on how much is spent on 
each. 
 Third, our analysis highlights the importance of funding agency decisions about 
the division of research budgets between younger and older researchers, and between 
numbers of awards and sizes of awards. Because younger investigators have longer 
careers than equally competent older investigators over which to use the newly created 
knowledge, we have argued that that there is good reason to tilt any future surge in 
spending toward younger scientists.  In addition, given multiple applications and the 
overstretch of the peer review system, it might increase efficiency for agencies to add 
program officers and find ways to deal more efficaciously with proposals, as indeed both 
NIH and NSF have begun to do. 
 In sum, if there is to be a new surge in research budgets, there are pitfalls to avoid 
from the NIH doubling experience, and different ways agencies could allocate funds that 
might get more research output for the dollars spent.  Additional research funding spent 
more efficaciously could attract and retain the young scientists on whom future progress 
depends and improve the flow of the new science that can help the US economy and 
contribute to the solution of the diverse problems that threaten global well-being.  
                                                 
23 See Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002) for international evidence or Hall and Van Reenen (2001) 
for a survey focusing on US evidence. 
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Table 1: Declining US Shares of World Science and Engineering Activity 
 
 
 Early Period Later Period  
Measure of Activity   
   
   College Enrollments 30% (1970) 13%(2005) 
    S&E  Undergraduate 
degrees 
~20% (1970) ~9% (2004) 
PhDs in S&E granted 40% (1970) 15% (2010) 
R&D ~50%(1970) ~35%  
ACS Chemical Abstracts 73% (1980) 40% (2003) 
All Science Articles 39% (1988) 29% (2005) 
All Citations 36% (1992) 30% (2002) 
 
 
Sources: 
College enrollments, Freeman (2008), based on tertiary enrollments from United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Institute for Statistics (2007). 
Montreal. 
 
S&E undergrad degrees, 2004 from NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2008, 
appendix table 2-37 excluding social sciences; 1970 estimate from Freeman (2008) 
PhDs granted, R&D, ACS chemical abstracts from Freeman (2006) 
Science articles, from NSF (2008), table 5-34 and NSF (2006),  
Citations from NSF (2008), appendix table 5-38   where 2002 refers to articles written in 
2001–03 cited by 2005 articles (%); 1992 refers to 1991–93 articles cited by 1995 articles  
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Table 2: Rationale for government support of R&D 
 
 
Justification for 
taxpayer support of 
R&D spending 
Basic research  
(federal grants, 
largely to 
universities  
Applied Research 
(e.g. R&D tax 
credits) 
What is the impact of 
Globalization on the 
rationale 
    
Knowledge spillovers yes Some Probably weakens rationale 
    
Economic 
Competitiveness None/little Yes 
Probably strengthens 
rationale 
    
 
 
Notes:- See text for a discussion
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Table 3: US Shares of USPTO Patents, Shares of World High Tech Output and 
Trade Balance in Manufacturing 
 
Measure 1980 1990 2000 2003 
     
US first name inventor share 
USPTO patent applications* 
55% 55% 56% 53% 
US first name inventor share 
EPO patent applications* 
27 27 26 23 
     
US share of World Gross 
Revenue in High Tech  
28 25 38 39 
US share of World Value 
added in High Tech  
25 25 40 42 
     
US share of World Exports 
in High Tech 
30 23 18 15 
US share of World Imports 
in High Tech 
13 18 20 17 
     
US trade balance in High 
Tech ($Billion) 
+34 +27 -40 -90 
     
 
Notes: * Patent statistics refer to 1985 as first year rather than 1980; 2005 (USPTO and 
2006 (EPO) as last year rather than 2003 
 
“High-technology manufacturing industries” as classified by Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development include aerospace, communications equipment, office 
machinery and computers, pharmaceuticals, and scientific instruments. Value added 
revenue excludes purchases of domestic and imported materials and inputs.  Constant 
dollar data for foreign countries calculated by deflating industry data valued in each 
country’s nominal domestic currency with a sector-specific price index constructed for 
that country and then converted to U.S. dollars based on average annual exchange rates. 
 
Source: National Science Foundation (2008) table 6.31 and table 6.32 for USPTO patent 
data, table 6-41 and 6-42 for EPO patent data; table 6.8 and 6.9 for value added.  Table 
6.14 and 6.15 for total revenue, exports and imports.  
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Table 4: Applications, Awards, and Success Rates for RO1 and Equivalent Grants, 
by status of applicant 
 
 
 
 1980 1998 2003 2006 2007 
      
POTENTIAL FIRST  
TIME AWARDEES 
     
Applications 8,515 6,817 8,377 9,399 -- 
Awards 1,903 1,484 1,720 1,384 1,663 
Success rate 22.3% 21.3% 20.5% 14.7% -- 
      
% of successful with 
original proposal 
86 61 49 34 28 
% of successful with First 
amendment 
13 29 38 40 41 
      
EXPERIENCED 
(PREVIOUSLY 
FUNDED) APPLICANTS 
     
Applications 7,404 13,666 16,325 19,822 -- 
Awards 3,240 4,782 5,730 4,677  
Success rate 43.8% 35.0% 35.1% 23.6%  
 
 
 
Source: appendix A table, from 
grants.nih.gov/grants/new_investigators/Workforce_Info09072007.ppt - 09-19-2007 –  
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Table 5: The reduced chance of getting NIH R01 grants and the increased number 
of submissions needed to get an NIH grant 
 
(a) New Submissions 
 
 1997 2003 2006 2007 
# Submissions 14,814 18,738 22,150 20,651 
# awards  3,476 4,526 3,612 3,961 
Success rate 23.5% 24.2% 16.3% 19.2% 
   For original submission  18.7% 17.0% 7.9% 8.4% 
     
Proportion winning on original submit 55% 51% 32% 28% 
Average # submissions per award   1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1 
     
Average Value of Award  $217,348 $345,426 $359,911 $382,782
 
 
(b) Continuation Grants 
 
 1997 2003 2006 2007 
# Submissions 5,510 5,785 6,830 6,586 
# awards 2,624 2,858 2,388 2,468 
Success rate 47.6% 49.4% 35.0% 37.5% 
   For original submission  47.5% 40.2% 25.7% 25.2% 
     
Proportion winning on original submit 44% 61.8% 41.8% 36.8% 
Average # submissions per award   1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 
     
Average Value of Award $261,662 $357,103 $374,288 $386,507
 
 
Source: Office of Extramural Research, NIH, “Success Rates for NIH Type 1 
Competing Research Project Applications,” 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/award/success.htm, excel file, by amendment status. 
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Table 6: National Science Foundation Research Proposals and Awards, 1997-2006 
 
 1997 2006 
   
Competitive proposals 19935 31514 
Competitive awards 5961 6708 
Funding rate 30% 21% 
Proposal Submitted per PI 
receiving one award 
1.7 2.2 
   
Average mean award size $78,223 $134,595 
 
Source : IPAMM, figure 2, figure 3, figure 4 
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Figure 1: Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) as a percentage 
of GDP in Selected Countries  
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Source : Authors’ calculations from OECD data, various years 
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Figure 2: 
The Acceleration and Deceleration of NIH Spending under the “doubling goal” 
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Figure 3: Comparison between Doubling research and the socially optimal path of 
increase 
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Notes: this compares a stylized version of the doubling of NIH funding to an optimal path 
when adjustment costs are convex. 
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Figure 4: The increase in the ratio of Post Docs to Principal Investigators 
In US Biomedical Labs and the Increase in Foreign Born Post Docs compared to US 
pos-docs. 
 
 
A) Postdocs compared to PIs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) US vs. Foreign-Born Post Docs 
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Figure 5: Number of Persons <35 years old getting RO1s 
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Appendix A: Additional data 
 
Table A1:  
FY  Applications  Awarded 
Success 
rate Applicants Awardees
Funding 
Rate
 
Applications  Awarded 
Success 
rate Applicants Awardees
Funding 
Rate
1980 8,515           1,903      22.3% 7,949 1,859 23.4% 7,404           3,240      43.8% 6,093          2,992          49.1%
1981 8,694           1,818      20.9% 8,097 1,766 21.8% 8,739           3,482      39.8% 7,100          3,253          45.8%
1982 8,106           1,598      19.7% 7,523 1,572 20.9% 9,937           3,628      36.5% 7,868          3,361          42.7%
1983 7,568           1,650      21.8% 6,948 1,607 23.1% 9,776           3,777      38.6% 7,797          3,498          44.9%
1984 7,440           1,637      22.0% 6,870 1,612 23.5% 9,934           3,887      39.1% 8,085          3,627          44.9%
1985 7,784           1,845      23.7% 7,013 1,809 25.8% 11,138         4,341      39.0% 8,917          4,021          45.1%
1986 7,305           1,683      23.0% 6,661 1,658 24.9% 11,302         4,328      38.3% 9,105          4,004          44.0%
1987 7,077           1,657      23.4% 6,388 1,629 25.5% 11,151         4,744      42.5% 9,066          4,364          48.1%
1988 7,774           1,780      22.9% 7,083 1,741 24.6% 11,565         4,329      37.4% 9,404          3,989          42.4%
1989 7,752           1,621      20.9% 7,068 1,590 22.5% 11,629         3,782      32.5% 9,430          3,547          37.6%
1990 7,838           1,394      17.8% 7,201 1,371 19.0% 11,997         3,371      28.1% 9,685          3,146          32.5%
1991 7,279           1,560      21.4% 6,652 1,539 23.1% 11,902         3,932      33.0% 9,653          3,679          38.1%
1992 7,200           1,473      20.5% 6,625 1,451 21.9% 12,602         4,262      33.8% 10,247         3,988          38.9%
1993 8,124           1,269      15.6% 7,408 1,246 16.8% 13,465         3,690      27.4% 10,831         3,458          31.9%
1994 8,832           1,453      16.5% 7,932 1,425 18.0% 14,337         4,269      29.8% 11,180         3,931          35.2%
1995 7,968           1,420      17.8% 7,217 1,399 19.4% 14,712         4,514      30.7% 11,458         4,173          36.4%
1996 7,017           1,356      19.3% 6,395 1,336 20.9% 14,043         4,419      31.5% 11,171         4,102          36.7%
1997 6,967           1,484      21.3% 6,313 1,453 23.0% 13,654         4,751      34.8% 10,862         4,413          40.6%
1998 6,817           1,545      22.7% 6,161 1,505 24.4% 13,666         4,782      35.0% 10,978         4,400          40.1%
1999 7,333           1,596      21.8% 6,592 1,561 23.7% 14,802         5,515      37.3% 11,834         5,063          42.8%
2000 7,479           1,642      22.0% 6,741 1,596 23.7% 14,750         5,466      37.1% 11,719         4,998          42.6%
2001 7,494           1,629      21.7% 6,691 1,580 23.6% 14,545         5,361      36.9% 11,625         4,975          42.8%
2002 7,632           1,612      21.1% 6,862 1,574 22.9% 14,640         5,222      35.7% 11,673         4,815          41.2%
2003 8,377           1,720      20.5% 7,380 1,680 22.8% 16,325         5,730      35.1% 12,647         5,243          41.5%
2004 9,413           1,578      16.8% 8,147 1,528 18.8% 18,241         5,457      29.9% 13,863         4,999          36.1%
2005 9,365           1,475      15.8% 8,195 1,441 17.6% 19,175         5,014      26.1% 14,410         4,631          32.1%
2006 9,399           1,384      14.7% 8,180 1,354 16.6% 19,822         4,677      23.6% 14,766         4,350          29.5%
Fiscal Years 1980 - 2006
Experienced (Previously Funded) Applicants
R01 Equivalent (R01, R23, R29, R37)
Potential First Time Awardee
SUCCESS AND FUNDING RATES OF FIRST TIME AND PREVIOUSLY FUNDED APPLICANTS
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Table A2: NIH CHANGES IN NUMBERS OF GRANTS AND DOLLAR 
SUPPORT 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Amount
Awarded 
Research Grants 
Number 
of 
Awards 
Award Amount 
2007 $21,263,805,742 47,181 $20,415,899,325 
2006 $23,182,959,918 46,797 $20,154,363,154 
2005 $23,410,118,044  47,345 $20,206,478,806  
2004 $22,900,576,587   47,464  $19,607,812,023 
2003 $21,866,798,411  46,081 $18,461,462,170  
2002 $19,074,464,796  43,520 $16,830,194,185  
2001 $16,784,681,877  40,666 $14,907,921,291  
2000 $14,791,024,329  38,302 $13,002,656,762  
1999 $12,855,628,060  35,870 $11,228,665,952  
1998 $11,179,749,719  33,703 $9,801,789,027  
1997 $10,456,030,704  32,109 $9,046,542,619  
        
Report Date: 2/12/08     
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Appendix B: Modeling researcher responses to short run changes in numbers of 
awards - A simple model of scientist behaviour 
 
I. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 
There are a pool of L potential researchers who submit either 0, 1 or 2 research bids24. If 
they submit they have a probability p of winning an award. This will be a function of 
researcher quality, z, and the number of awards made available by the government, N (we 
take these as exogenous common knowledge) so p = f(Z,N,.) and is increasing in both 
arguments.  Let us assume that the support of the distribution of researcher quality is 
[0,1]. A researcher is only allowed to accept a maximum of one award at a time (so if he 
wins two he can only take one). Winning an award gives value to the researcher (funds) 
of V, losing is normalized to zero. The cost of putting a bid together is c. 
 
The net utility of submitting one bid is u(1)25 
 
cpVu −=)1(  
 
The net utility of submitting two bids is u(2) 
cVppcVpu 2)2(2))1(1()2( 2 −−=−−−=  
 
A scientist will not submit a bid if 0)1( <u , i.e. 
V
cp < .  
Define the benefit-cost ratio as β = V/c and the threshold probability as 
β
1~ =p . Thus if pp ~<  the researcher will choose not to bid. 
 
When will the scientist put in two bids? This will occur if u(2) > u(1). This condition can 
be written as 
                                                 
24 For simplicity we cap the maximum number of bids as two, but consider larger number of bids in the 
extensions below. 
25 The model assumes risk neutrality. If we incorporate risk aversion the same basic intuitions come 
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012 >−+− pp ββ  
This quadratic form has two solutions that define two more threshold value of p: 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= β
411
2
1p  and ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= β
411
2
1p  
subject to the regularity conditions that the value of β  must allow p to be defined on the 
(0,1) support (e.g. β >4).  
 
These three thresholds define scientist behavior over four regimes (see Figure A1).  
(A) pp ~<  researcher will bid zero. 
(B)  p~ < p< p  researcher will make one bid  
(C) p < p< p researcher will make two bids 
(D) p < p researcher will make one bid. 
 
The intuition is the following. In Regime (A), the probability of winning is too low to 
cover the costs (in expected terms). In regime (D), “star scientist” the probability of 
winning is so high that there is not much benefit from a second bid. In Regime (C), the 
chances of winning are not quite so high, so researcher finds it pays to take out a second 
ticket. In Regime (B) it is worth making a bid, but because these scientists are on the 
margin (“marginal quality”) of not bidding, they do not find it is worth the cost of two 
bids. 
 
Comparative statics in β  
 
If the value of the award rises (β  up) then this will change the thresholds. p~  will fall, 
p will fall and p will rise. This means (a) there will be a larger number of bids, (b) there 
will be larger number of scientists making two bids  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
through. 
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II. EQUILIBRIUM 
There are M bidders, L potential bidders and a total number N of awards available. In a 
rational expectations equilibrium the probabilities have to adjust so that the number of 
awards given out equals the expected ex ante probability of success integrated across all 
scientists. In our simple case: 
NdpNzpM =∫
1
0
),(  
 
Since p and M are now endogenous we must solve the model in terms of the exogenous 
variables z and N. We can define analogous thresholds to ( p~ , p and p ) in the space of 
researcher quality ( z~ , z and z ). These can be written as functions of the benefit-cost 
ratio, β and the number of potential awards.  
 
Comparative statics in β  
If the number of awards falls all the thresholds shift to the right. The probability of 
winning a bid will fall so fewer scientists will submit any bids. Similarly if the number of 
awards rises then the thresholds shift to the left and there are more bids. 
 
In terms of the numbers making two bids, this depends on the functional forms and the 
magnitude of the change in N. The following seems like a reasonable description of the 
doubling and post-doubling period, however. During the doubling period the thresholds 
all shift to the left but the proportion of (potential  L) scientists in Regime C who make 
two bids stays the same ( z - z ).  
 
Compare this to the post-doubling period. We keep  ( z - z ) the same, but all thresholds 
have moved to the right so there is a smaller margin of scientists in Regime D. This 
means that of all the winning bids, the proportion of scientists submitting two bids has 
increased (i.e. ( z - z )/(1- z~ ) is larger).  
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The intuition is clear. During the post-doubling period many of the “star scientists” 
during the doubling period can no longer feel confident in winning an award, so they put 
in two awards to increase their probability of a successful draw. 
 
These ideas are illustrated in Figures A2 and A3. 
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